ABSTRACT In order to analyze the reliability of redundancy architecture for flight control computer, this paper gives the analytical study on the reliability based on the Homogeneous Markov Process in ''Triplex Channels & Single Module'' and ''Double Channels & Double Modules.'' The paper analyzes the effect of fault rate and fault coverage rate on system reliabilities and MTTFs (mean time to failures). The index of fault tolerant capability is proposed. The analyzing results show that, for different redundancy architectures, the fault coverage rate or the branch fault rate have different effects on the reliability. Especially, the influence of the branch fault rate is more significant. In addition, the fault tolerant capability of the redundant system to multiple faults is determined by the system architecture scheme and the fault coverage rate. The results show that the method proposed in this paper can analyze reliability of redundancy architecture effectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of aeronautics and astronautics, the flight vehicles require high reliability, especially the reliability of the flight control system [1] . In order to ensure high reliability and high security of the flight control system, ''fault-tolerant design'' is often chosen. The principle is to improve the system reliability by increasing the redundancy source and shielding the fault effect [2] , [3] . Dual redundancy and triplex redundancy are often adopted in the high reliability and high security flight control system with fault-tolerant technology [4] .
Reliability is an ability of a product to complete the specified function within a specified time, under specified conditions [5] . Many mature theories and methods, such as the Monte Carlo method, the Binomial Expansion method and the Fault Tree method [6] as well as the Markov State Diagram method [7] and the latest General Stochastic Petri Net method [8] , [9] , can be utilized for the reliability assessment to some complex systems [10] , [11] . It is known that the Monte Carlo method works with a low computational efficiency [12] and the Binomial Expansion method works with a poor accuracy [13] . The Fault Tree method depends on a large amount of calculation in the analysis of complex system [14] and the Stochastic Petri Net method is difficult to apply multiple known probability information [15] , [16] . As compared to the methods aforementioned, the Markov State Diagram method uses dynamic model with multiple reliability factors and multiple reliability indices which can be obtained by modeling only one time. Moreover, this method can guarantee certain accuracy. Using the Markov State Diagram method, this paper mainly presents several probability indices or the time indices, such as reliability, fault coverage rate, fault rate and mean time to failures (MTTF), to evaluate the reliability.
This paper introduces two kinds of redundancy architecture scheme for flight control computer (FCC): Triplex Channels & Single Module (TCSM) and Double Channels & Double Modules (DCDM) [17] - [19] . Firstly, by using the Markov model, the state definition and the transition analysis are shown, and then the reliabilities are studied. Secondly, by the simulating calculation with MATLAB, the effects on the system reliabilities and MTTFs of these two schemes under the factors, such as the fault rate and the fault coverage rate, are compared and analyzed. Eventually, from the above analysis, this paper also proposes the fault tolerance capability index TC m ∈ [0, 1].
II. MODELING AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF HOMOGENEOUS MARKOV PROCESS
When the fault rates and the repair rates of parts of the control system are constants, the change of system state is only related to the time interval t (note that transition probability is tλ where λ is fault rate). Therefore, the system can be described by the homogeneous Markov process with the analysis steps giving as follows:
1) Defining the various states of the system. System state means the specific conditions of the system at a certain time, such as normal, channel-switch, fault, and dangerous state;
2) Analyzing the transfer relationships between each state, then establishing a state transition diagram;
3) According to the state transition diagram, writing a state transition matrix; 4) Solving the equation, and getting the occurrence probability of each state by combining with the initial conditions; 5) Calculating the reliability of the system. On the analysis of the transfer relationships between the states, a dangerous state cannot transfer to a safe state, i.e., it is an absorbing state. When solving the system reliability, a non-dangerous fault state is also an absorbing state, and the reliability is equal to the sum of the probability when the system is working in the reliable state.
The redundancy analysis of the flight control computer is primarily based on the following assumptions:
1) The system cannot be repaired, i.e. the repair rate is 0; 2) At some point only one fault can be triggered, regardless of the extreme possibility that two faults occur at the same time;
3) When the fault coverage rate c is certain, only detectable fault and undetectable fault exist in the system; 4) In the initial stage, all the states of the channels are normal.
If a branch works normally at time t and the fault rate is λ, the probability of fault occurrence at t + t time is p = 1 − e −λ t . In general, λ t (for electronic equipment) is a very small value, so p = 1 − e −λ t ≈ λ t. As such, the probability of a malfunctioned branch is cλ t (successfully detected) or (1 − c)λ t (undetected) where c is the fault coverage rate.
III. RELIABILITY MODELING AND ANALYZING OF TRIPLEX CHANNELS & SINGLE MODULE FCC A. RELIABILITY MODELING
Triplex Channels & Single Module Flight Control Computer (TCSM-FCC) contains three separate control channels, as shown in Figure 1 . In the theoretical analysis it is deemed that all fault types of three channels work independently, regardless of the corresponding common-mode fault type. After receiving three flight control channels' self-check states and rudder control instructions, the arbitration selector issues voting instructions to control multi-branch selector switch in order to switch the control of the servo steering gear.
In practical applications, the fault coverage rate c could not reach 100%. Therefore, two kinds of fault types, which are detectable faults and undetectable faults, exist in FCC. First, the arbitration selector checks every channel's selfcheck state. Then, if it discovers any detectable fault in a channel, the output of this channel will be shielded. Otherwise, the arbitration selector will choose the right channel with the principle of ''2 out of 3'' [20] , [21] by comparing rudder control instructions of the three channels. A selection of the fault states that might occur in TCSM-FCC are shown in Table 1 . According to the state list, we draw the Markov state transition diagram, as shown in Figure. 2. Figure. 2 depicts TCSM-FCC's state combination and transformation under the action of a certain fault rate and fault coverage rate. The top is the initial state that the three channels are all effective. With each channel appearing constantly detectable faults or undetectable faults, three channels are all in fault state eventually. For State 1, 2 and 3, namely two or more than two channels of FCC are normal, the available computer channel can be clearly obtained by the voting method ''2 out of 3,'' i.e. these states are ''safety state.'' However, in the case of two computer channels having problems, such as State 4, 5 and 6, it is important to consider the fault types:
State 4: two channels are at detectable fault and the third is normal. At this point, the third normal computer channel is selected as the control channel, because the arbitration selector clearly receives the warning signals of the two fault channels. Therefore, it is also ''safety state.'' State 5: one channel is at detectable fault, another is at undetectable fault and the third is normal. At this point, the arbitration selector can only separate the detectable fault channel clearly. For the other two channels, because their outputs are not consistent, the arbitration selector can only speculate that at least a channel appears detected fault. However, it cannot determine the fault source. Consequently, it is hard to make sure the arbitration selector is able to choose the right output. Hence, it is ''risk state,'' i.e. FCC is on the verge of complete paralysis.
State 6: two channels are at undetectable fault. In this case, the three channels do not issue any self-check alarm signal, but these channels may output three different rudder control instructions. Therefore, the arbitration selector cannot make a choice. This state is similar to State 5, thus it is also ''risk state.'' For State 7 to 10, at this time all the channels are at detectable fault or undetectable fault. Consequently, no matter which selection strategy the arbitration selector adopts, it cannot ensure the flight safety. Therefore, they are ''dangerous state.''
In conclusion, the first four states are ''safe state.'' While the State 5, 6 are ''risk state,'' and the State 7 to 10 are ''dangerous state.''
B. ANALYZING
The probability p j (t) = p{X (t) = j} of the flight control computer in State j at time t can be solved by Eq.1.
Here,
and A is state transition density matrix. Once P(t) is solved, the probabilities in every state at time t can be acquired and the reliability R s (t) = p 1 (t) + p 2 (t) + p 3 (t) + p 4 (t). From Fig. 2 , the state transition density matrix A is as shown at the bottom of this page.
The initial system is set in State 0 and
. The differential equation of Eq.1 is numerically studied in this paper by using the Runge-kutta differential solver Ode45 () of MATLAB [22] - [27] .
In order to investigate the effect of the fault rate λ on the reliability R s , we let the fault coverage rate c = 0.6. For a certain time span t = 4000h, the results by the numerical solution method are shown in Figure 3 . Fig. 3 shows that the fault rate λ of the channel affects the reliability R s significantly. With the fault rate λ decreasing, the reliability of TCSM-FCC increases rapidly. When the fault rate λ is less than 0.0005, the probability that TCSM-FCC can work 1,000 hours constantly is more than 80%.
In order to investigate the effect of the fault coverage rate c on the reliability R s , we let the channel fault rate λ = 0.001. For a certain time span t = 4000h, the results by the numerical solution method are shown in Figure 4 . If the analytic expression of the reliability R s is known, the MTTF can be solved by MTTF = ∞ 0 R s (t)dt. And for the numerical solution method being adopted in this paper, we can apply Eq.2 to solve.
Here, Q w (0) is the combined probability of the initial state, and
The combined effect on MTTF of FCC has been investigated under different combinations of the fault rate λ and the fault coverage rate c. The results are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that the channel fault rate λ affects MTTF significantly, and the fault coverage rate c can affect the reliability of the system in the same order of magnitude.
IV. RELIABILITY MODELING AND ANALYZING OF DOUBLE CHANNELS & DOUBLE MODULES FCC
A. RELIABILITY MODELING Double Channels & Double Modules FCC (DCDM-FCC) adopts double channels design. Each computer channel contains two independent processing branches and a FPGA comparator. The two separate channels share one arbiter. The hardware architecture scheme is shown in Figure 5 . For each flight control computer channel, its two independent processing branches possess complete data receiving, decoding and sending functions as well as a certain self-monitoring capability. The channel comparator determines the final output of the channel by the self-monitoring data of the monitoring branch and the comparison between the output data of two branches. Ac-cording to two channels' output states, the arbitration selector decides the final output of FCC. Here, we ignore the channel common-mode fault, i.e. the same fault will not be generated in the two branches of the same channel at the same time.
Based on the state combinations of the four branches of the two channels, the DCDM-FCC may present the following fault state combinations as shown in Table 3 . According to Table 3 , we draw the Markov transition process, as shown in Figure 6 . The Markov transition process of DCDM-FCC contains five stages. In each stage, the probabilities that the state maintains constant are the same, which are respectively 1 − 4λ t, 1 − 3λ t, 1 − 2λ t, 1 − λ t and 1.
As State 1 of Stage One and State 2, 7 of Stage Two have three or more than three normal branches, the arbitration selector can output correctly. Thus, they're ''safety state.'' For Stage Three, in the system two branches are at detectable fault or undetectable fault. For the State 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 with undetectable faults, the arbitration selector can choose the right output channels exactly. Therefore, they're also ''safety state.'' However, for State 9, with single branch being at undetectable fault in each channel, the arbitration selector obtains information which is a ''contrast is inconsistent'' warning signal of the two channels. Therefore, it cannot choose safely and State 9 is ''risk state'' with half of the probability that it may choose the branch with undetectable fault as the system output.
Within Stage Four, which contains six states from State 10 to State 15, three branches are at detectable fault or undetectable fault in the system. For State 10, 12 and 14, they all share one trait as follows. Two branches are at fault in one channel while only one branch is at detectable fault in the other channel. Thus, the arbitration selector receives the warning signals which are ''contrast is inconsistent'' and ''single branch is at detectable fault.'' Then the system automatically selects the branch without any warning in the ''single branch is at detectable fault'' channel as the final output to guarantee the system into the ''safety state.'' Nevertheless, for State 11, 13 and 15, the arbitration selector cannot determine who is normal from the warning signals so that it may choose the wrong one. Hence these are ''risk state.'' For Stage Five, all the branches are at detectable fault or undetectable fault. Consequently, the flight control computer runs into ''dangerous state'' completely.
In Similar to the previous section, we solve the probability p j (t) = p{X (t) = j} of the flight control computer in State j at time t as well as the reliability In order to investigate the effect of the fault rate λ on the reliability R s , we set the fault coverage rate c = 0.6. For a certain time span t = 4000h, the results by the numerical solution method are shown in Figure. 7.
FIGURE 7.
The effect of the different fault rates λ on the reliability R s (c = 0.06). Fig. 7 indicates that the fault rate λ of the channel affects the reliability R s significantly. With the fault rate λ decreasing, the system reliability increases rapidly. When the fault rate λ is less than 0.0005, the probability that DCDM-FCC can work 1,000 hours constantly is more than 93%. When the fault rate λ is less than 0.0001, the probability that DCDM-FCC can work more than 10,000 hours constantly is about 70%.
In order to investigate the effect of the fault coverage rate c on the reliability R s , we let the channel fault rate λ = 0.001. For a certain time span t = 4000h, the results by the numerical solution method are shown in Figure. 8. Figure. 8 shows that the fault coverage rate c affects the reliability R s largely. Nevertheless the change trends of the reliabilities R s under the different fault coverage rates c are basically the same. The combined effect on MTTF of FCC has been studied under different combinations of the fault rate λ and the fault coverage rate c. The results are shown in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that the channel fault rate λ affects MTTF seriously, and the fault coverage rate c can affect the reliability of the system in the same order of magnitude.
V. COMPARING AND ANALYZING

A. THE INFLUENCE OF BASIC PARAMETERS ON THE RELIABILITY
In order to investigate the effect of the fault rates λ of the single branch on the system reliability, we let the fault coverage rate c = 0.8, as shown in Figure. 9.
It can be seen that the reliability of the architecture scheme of DCDM-FCC is higher than the one of TCSM with the different values of the single branch fault rate λ under a certain fault coverage rate. Although it is a disadvantage that the arbitration selector cannot compare between channels in the architecture scheme of DCDM-FCC, the branch comparator in the channel is still able to guarantee an enough high reliability. In order to analyze the effect on these two redundancy architectures under the different fault coverage rates, we let the single branch fault rate λ = 0.001, as shown in Fig. 10 .
It can be seen that the reliability of the architecture scheme of DCDM-FCC is still higher under different fault coverage rates. It is worth noting that the reliabilities of two architectures are very similar if the fault coverage rate is c = 0. This shows that for the DCDM-FCC, the fault coverage rate contributes much more to improve the reliability of the system. This is because DCDM-FCC identifies the undetectable fault weakly. Once an undetectable occurs in a certain channel, it will cause the branch comparator to be unable to determine the correct output of the channel. In this case, the system functions only with the condition that the other channel does not appear the fault of ''contrast is inconsistent between channels.'' The comparing result with MTTFs of the two kinds of redundancy architectures shows that except for the disadvantage situation of the fault coverage rate c = 0, the MTTFs of DCDM-FCC all gain a greater advantage under the other combinations of the fault coverage rates and the fault rates.
B. THE INDEX OF FAULT TOLERANT CAPABILITY OF THE REDUNDANCY ARCHITECTURE
According to the analysis of TCSM and DCDM-FCC in the paper, it is sure that the TCSM system can bear the first fault, and possesses a certain bearing capacity to some forms of the second fault, but cannot bear the third. By comparison, the DCDM-FCC system can bear the first fault, and possesses a certain bearing capacity to some forms of the second or third fault, but cannot bear the fourth.
Based on the data obtained in this paper, the index of fault tolerant capability TC m ∈ [0, 1] is proposed, meaning the probability that the correct output can still be guaranteed when the fault occurs m times in the system.
Here, R m is the sum of the probabilities of the entire fault states that occur m times in the Markov state transition diagram;
R sm is the sum of the probabilities of the entire safety states with fault states occurring m times in the Markov state transition diagram. According to the analysis of the two kinds of redundant architectures, the expressions are as follows:
Fault tolerant index of the TCSM system to the second fault:
Fault tolerant index of the DCDM system to the second fault:
Fault tolerant index of the DCDM system to the third fault:
Based on the data obtained in this paper, we can obtain the fault tolerant capability indices under different kinds of the fault rates and the fault coverage rates, respectively as shown in Table 5 , Table 6 and Table 7 . According to the above fault tolerant capability indices, the following conclusions can be acquired:
1) The fault tolerant capability of the redundant system to multiple faults is depending on the system architecture scheme and the fault coverage rate but independent of the fault rate of the single branch.
2) Improving the fault coverage rate can effectively enhance the fault tolerant capability of the redundant sys-tem to multiple faults.
3) When the fault coverage rate reaches 100% that any undetectable fault does not exist, the redundant system is able to obtain the maximum fault tolerant capability in theory. At this point, the system can be guaranteed to output correctly just by one branch being intact.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper utilizes homogeneous Markov process method to analyze and compare the performance of the two redundant modes of TCSM and DCDM for flight control computer. The conclusions are concluded as follows.
1) In general, the reliability of the redundant system is much higher than the one of the single module system.
2) The fault coverage rate and the branch fault rate have different effects on the reliability for different redundancy architectures.
3) Compared to the fault coverage rate, the branch fault rate retains a more significant influence on the reliability of the redundant system. Therefore, in the practical application, it is prior to improve the reliability of the part in the branch as far as possible.
4) As compared to the important role of the system architecture scheme and the fault coverage rate on the fault tolerant capability of the redundant system to multiple faults, the fault rate of the single branch has no impact. 5) Improving the fault coverage rate can effectively enhance the fault tolerant capability of the redundant system to multiple faults.
